August 4th, 2006, Ministry of Defence compound in Tel Aviv. Three weeks had already passed since commencement of operations up north. The Security Cabinet convenes to discuss options ahead. Amir Peretz, Minister of Defence, opens the meeting:

"At the beginning of hostilities we faced four options: (1) the 'lever' approach (pressuring Lebanon to deal with Hizbollah) (2) Decision from the Air (The Israeli Air Force will deal with Hizballah); (3) Diplomacy and international intervention (The UN will deal with Hizballah); (4) and, the less popular one, a joint, inter-service, inter-agency manoeuvre, including Land, Air, Naval, Intelligence, Mossad, Diplomacy and Media components (Israel will deal with Hizballah).

After twenty four days of fighting, it could be said we have gradually tried all approaches, only to arrive at the fourth one, the multi-dimensional manoeuvre, as our last resort, from an inferior, responsive posture. There are now 4 issues to resolve:

(1)Our understanding of the opponent – on the one hand, we have not done enough to detach Hizballah from the Palestinian context (a ceasefire with Hammas in Gaza could isolate Nasrallah, and show the Palestinians, a clear demonstration of our capabilities); at the same time, we have not done enough to detach Hizballah from the Lebanese government, (through diplomatic pressure on Seniora to talk directly with Israel and reach agreement surpassing Hizballah, backed by international incentives to do so).

(2)Lebanon 'then and now'. What has changed? In 1982 we operated in the space of a state caught in a civil war, in order to solve a problem 'external' to it (Palestinian refugees that become a source of terror against Israel). Our enemy was organized as militias at best. The Syrians were present but generally kept out of the fight. In 2006 we are operating in a space having a legitimate, sovereign government, in order to solve an 'internal' problem which is unseparable from Lebanon's politics and culture. Our enemy is well organised and has the capabilties of a regular army. His prevailing logic is 'terrorization'; his mode of action, 'guerrilla'. Syria may be out but the Iranians are in deep. In that sense, the 2006 move is far more ambitious than 1982. I'm not sure you are aware of that.

(3)Campaign duration: I find the disagreement as to how much time the operation could proceed, alarming. There are those claiming the cessation of operations is a matter of days, determined by the speed UN security-council decision passes; at the same time, there are those asserting there is no time limit on IDF's operations. If the clock tickers are correct, IDF activity on the ground is conducted in contradiction (since linear terrestrial manoevre needs time to accummulate effective momentum). Yet, to assume these operations are timeless, is strategic ignorance no less.

(4)Diplomatic Channel: the reason we were forced to act against Hizballah, is a proof of failure of the diplomatic track, in implementing UN security council decision no' 1559. Yet, we continue to put our hopes in it. Linking our exit strategy to the entering strategy of a significant internatinoal

force, prevents us from critically discussing the operation timeframe, while entangling us in another lengthy plodding at Lebanese mud.

To sum up, the lack of a common, agreed upon end-state, degrades us to tactical thinking on the *now*, instead of envisioning a desired future. That is, we remain responsive in our actions, even though our results are improving. However, we must realize ending military operations in a ceasefire, will deny us future potential for pre-emption (independent action against Hizballah) in the near future. This is the worst outlet of all. If we come to a realization that we cannot handle Hizballah effectively on our own, we should disengage immediately without agreement, exit Lebanon, regroup, retrain and launch the next phase on our own accord.

We should also consider how to escape our catch twenty-one in which the longer the fighting, the greatest expectations are among Israeli public, for achievements. In that sense, there remains a sharp incongruence between our strategic directive, and movement on the ground. My sense is we are developing the manoeuvre backwards. Our phased action may be typical to terrestrial manoeuvre, but shows no creative thinking in solving a problem the scope presented by Hizballah. Moreover, it demands much more resources (and causes much more losses) in lives and in material, in the front and in the rear.

In order to achieve current operation objectives, we must takeover the entire terrestrial space south of the Litani, and mop it up in a sisyphean fashion, although Hizballah fighters are expecting us. We would need to recruit the majority of our reserve forces for a long period, and they would definitely suffer many casualties. Plus, brining reservists into the fight opens a wider door for criticism towards military moves, as they are first civilans, then soldiers. If we do not secure hold of this space south of the Litani, the problem or short range rockets will not be solved. Long-range missiles the IAF can cope with. But the more it continues 'punishing' the Lebanese population, by collateral damage or direct targeting of civilian sites, it makes it harder for us to convince the Lebanese we are the good guys". End of speech.

The Winograd committee did not read that stenogram because that speech was never delivered. It was a letter sent by me to the Minister of Defense on August 4th, frustrated by the perplexity demonstrated by our strategic-political leadership.

On 12th July 2006 Israel's cabinet decided on a change of policy in the northern arena, but from the wrong factors and for the wrong objectives. As a result, the military outplayed a stutterred campaign, resulting in a huge gap between declared objectives and disputed accomplishments. To be blunt, we were enticed into war on the basis of statistics of kidnapping, rather than launched a pre-emptive campaign, one that could transform inconvenient geo-strategy that emerged in that region since September eleventh.

I was asked to share with you today my perception of what went wrong during the Second Lebanon War, and whether doctrine played a role in that turn of events. Impartial observer in this matter, I am not – Between the years 2000 and 2006, I was a member of the Operational Theory Research Institute

of the IDF (OTRI). In the summer of 2006, OTRI became synonymous with much of the command upheaval, that characterised that war.

Initially it was a one man's caprice of a tiny operational think-tank, run by three retired generals, and aimed at developing a Israeli version of operational art. Overtime, it won the endorsement of the Chiefs and Vices of the General Staff, was formalized and incorporated 4 functions:

(1) A research center, developing IDF's unique version of operational knowledge; (2) a school, running the advanced operational command course, which educated and trained senior commanders in operational-systemic practices; (3) a laboratory, interfacing scholars and practitioners in experimentations; and (4), a mechanism, transofrming IDF's corporate culture by networking its various operational agents.

In June 2006, several weeks before the war broke, OTRI was disbanded. The act was an informal one and quite dirty in its execution. It is quite symbolic though, the IDF entered the Second Lebanon War without an institute dedicated to Operational thinking.

The title I chose for my talk stems from archaic origins of the term 'doctrine'. *Docere* means 'teach' and in its widest sense, includes learning and instruction. Dictionaries also associate doctrine with dogma, that is, a principle or position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge or a system of belief. From a military perspective, it is one thing to treat doctrine as a learning tool advancing the creation of new knowledge (and thus an open construct, open to criticism and suggestions), then treating it as a sanctified text or canon (a closed construct), to be literally adhered to at times of crises. The challenge is to balance these two opposites.

Seven years into the deadly conflict with the Palestinians, The IDF found asymmetry to be working in the rival's favour. At the time, IDF doctrine, modes of thinking and planning, organizational patterns and forms of warfare were all targeted against state-like, symmetric adversaries. In fact, they haven't changed much since the days of Napoleon… Growing tensions between existing paradigm and emerging reality made the IDF war machine irrelevant, and in desperate need of transformation.

It was up to OTRI to develop a methodology, that enabled continuous change as it shaped reality. Composed of people with rich fighting experience and multidisciplinary backgrounds, it began developing that new praxis for operations, having CENTCOM functioned as its laboratory. By embracing operational thinking, the IDF was able to overcome the problem of having to perform on the basis of vague strategy, or no declared strategy.

A metaphor taken from the world of construction is useful, in explaining the challenges facing the command system in its three functional environments. In a similar fashion to relations between entrepreneurs, architects and artisans, statesmen set strategy for militaries, in various shades of clarity. By definition, politics abide to no rules, nor does it bend to scientific standards.

At the other end, warfighters are trained to do the exact opposite. In their domain, ontology reigns. They operate within given sets of rules and work with

existing molds and patterns. The operational commander's challenge is to synchronize these two command environments. That is – create a new framework which embodies strategy on the one hand, but, enables the manipulation of existing organizational forms to execute that strategy.

Systemic Operational Design was therefore developed, as a practice for senior level executives which philosophy offered, a new approach to thinking, learning, and action. SOD provided a methodology for sense-making of complex emergences and developed system-oriented strategies.

So what is SOD? it is an evolutionary, structured-brainstorming process, comprising a learning system. Its product is a new concept, which is then implemented, re-evaluated, and re-designed, according to our reading of the situation. SOD generates paradigms (or guiding frameworks) that allow us to perform, while constantly challenging these frameworks through which we perceive new trends. By doing so, it allows us to both *create* the box but also, to *think out of* it.

 SOD thrives on change. It asks 'what is different?' rather than seek similarities and impose them. This unique thinking methodology advances organizational learning through discourse, utilizing the different interpretations of various command agents. In that sense, SOD is both essential and committing.

In other words, SOD is an engine *perpetuating* strategy. By changing the entire routine of the organization, it 'immunizes' institutions against having to deal with crisis management, and offers them methodology for pro-action instead.

SOD takes doctrine to be the apotheosis of the organization's intellectual journey, as much as a point of departure for the next journey. In other words, at any given time, doctrine is as relevant as it is obsolete: to quote Francois Jullien, "*the essence of warfare is to betray the model*."

And so, forming of strategy and forming of doctrine are two opposing processes that should complement each other, for a military machinery to work properly. Doctrine sets the boundaries of an institution and strategy unbounds it. For the western mind, this sounds like a recipee for disaster. For non-western mind, interplay between polar opposites is of the essence (the notion of Dao) –

Strategy is about laying the foundations for manoeuvre rather than playing it out cunningly. Taken from Jullien, Although we do not devise a plan in strategy, we do come up with a strategic *configuration*, and the objective conditioning that it produces.

In this fashion, what OTRI sought to embed in the operational and strategic echelons of IDF command system, was a an entirely different regime of ongoing activity, that maintained strategic potential of the organization. It provided the *how* of the process, but refrained from intervening in its content (the *what*).

The reason was very plain – although each OTRI member had his/her unique command experience and area of specialty (I for one gained expertise

on operational manoeuvre and special operations), we did not have the mandate, nor were we accountable for conduct of operations. We were coaches rather than advisers, since our philosophy stated only the commander in charge, could design the operation he or she were to implement.

One could see why OTRI and its leading platform, SOD, gained so much resistance.

Yet most of it was feeding the undercurrents as in general, senior officers did not wish to be perceived as anti-intellectuals. At the same time, SOD is such an excruciating process that most senior officers lacked the intellectual stamina to endure it…

Part of the resistance (turned into criticism) was due to the *new language* promoted by OTRI, to explain the operational domain. Yet by definition, emerging trends and novel situations, reside outside our mindframe, thus meriting *new* language – Strategic trending is done by means of pattern recognition. Each pattern is a three-part rule, expressing relations between context, problem, and solution. The engagement between existing patterns and a given context is what generates new patterns (novel solutions to new problems).

Good operational design entails the ability, to share a pattern language: (1) One must be able to express the idea not in loose, general terms, but with the precision needed to turn it into a pattern; (2) one must be able to draw the idea, since it defines a field of spatial relations; (3) one must give it a name. So long as a pattern has a weak name, it means that it is not a clear concept, and the general cannot clearly tell his subordinates what to do to make 'one'.

The central task of operational design is to creat a single, shared, evolving pattern language, which everyone contributes to and everyone can use. It is equally important that the person who designs the structure also be in charge, of making it happen.

And so, we return to 2006. In April that year, Dan Halutz wholeheartedly approved the latest version of IDF's operational concept, developed over a period of three years by Doctrine Division, Operations Branch. The process was similar to that taken at other militaries, whereby teams of active officers, reservists, government agents and academics, conducted series of discussions that were then drafted, circulated and re-drafted, until the final version was published. Process wise, it suffered the same malais each organization is familiar with – constant shuffle of personnel and positions, scarcity of time and limited attention span.

Yet, there were 3 factors that determined the futility of that process: (1) Doctrine division failed to synchronize the various working teams into a coherent learning system, thus many contradictions and logical gaps ensued in the final product; (2) although Jointness was a leading buzz-word running like a thread in the document, research teams were not truly joint and eternalized combined-arms posture; and (3), there was no experimentation effort carried to complement concept development but one.

In fact, the last IDF excerise at operational-strategic command level was carried out in 2004! Reflecting serious tensions in the shift from traditional command to operational command practices, the system was 'stuck' with a new paradigm, but old modes of action.

(1)   The final product was a mismatch of old and new. In particular, it struggled to offer relevant interpretations to traditional tensions. Yet, that was *OK*. In the hands of operationally *literate* leadership, that product could have generated fruitful discourse across the the implications of a growing *cultural* asymmetry between Israel and its various opponents;

(2)   the false understanding that cultural asymmetry meant a limiting of freedom of terrestrial manoeuvre;

(3)   the reliance on technological breakthroughs that yielded no breakthroughs in such asymmetry;

(4)   the need to redefine decision mechanisms in such asymmetry (from destruction to operational shock and disintegration);

(5)   the contradiction between a traditional need to conduct short wars, to perceiving new wars as prolonged ones;

(6)   the shift from existential conflict to a conscious one, not realizing they only exist in mixture and in every type of model;

(7)   a spectrum of *generic* models of conflict facing Israel was determined, but Israel's *ontological* opponents were also labeled. It perceived Israeli's enemies as unidimensional since they had to fit into a single category (either Low Intensity; high intensity; no shared border; or non-conventional). Believe it or not, the confrontation in Southern Lebanon was referred to as Low-Intensity Conflict!, and Hizbollah, a movement for national liberation! …

(8) finally, by failing to grasp the interrelations between command structure, joint application and operational learning, any potential for effective conduct of operations, was in question.

command system, and tensions could be thought through to a workable solution. Let me mention those tensions that, upon critical review, could have impacted the war's conduct::

That was demonstrated in a confusion between the logical, spatial, and organizational dimensions of command arrangements. There was uncritical adoption of foreign terminology (a theater of war, theater of a campaign and theater of operations), in relation to Israel's unique strategic characteristics.

The way we design our command system, affects our ability to make sense of a situation, and each unique context may require an adaptation in exsiting command arrangements. By unique context I am also relating to the rival system's arrangements. The whole idea is to design command functions that each excerises a unique outlook on the evolving situation so that through discourse, a wholistic picture of the emerging manoeuvre could be discerned.

On 12th July 2006, the IDF was headed by an aviator. Trained in the Israeli Air Force, he never participated in a command course at any level, had zero joint command experience and was totally ignorant when it came to Land or Naval force employment.

The Second Lebanon War was also affected by the aerial nepotism of Halutz's General Staff, characterized by averageness, shallow mindedness and unidimensionality, as things do seem from a cockpit. The overall approach was of contracting (zero in design, ten in planning) and bureaucratic technology (every problem had a logical solution as long as it resided within our conceptual system). Visionary, creative, intellectual people did not fit that profile.

His General Staff exercised *silence of the lambs* under a uniformed Hanibaal Lecter… There was no discourse within Halutz's General Staff. No opposition or resistance. He presented the politicians one voice, his voice, when in the past it was customary to carry up military debate on strategic issues, to the Security Cabinet. In Halutz's term, he refused such General access...

Thus, Halutz was entitled to castrate NorthCom should he saw fit under the circumstances. But the consequences were, all command functions were centralized in a single component, Operations Division, Tel Aviv, that "discoursed" with itself...

Moreover, the strategic command function did not do what it was ought to do – that is – synchronise the system of systems of regional theatres in one coherent strategy. And so, during those weeks, the Palestinian arenas were not only neglected, but as I mentioned, exercised independent strategies.

Northern Command was deprived of responsibility for designing and conducting the campaign in its area of operations. The operations branch was basically designing, planning, issuing orders and analyzing whatever operations took place. The various arms operated disjointly. There were several blueprints to choose from as a response on the 12th July. The inadequacy of the chosen one was reflected in thirteen 'trend-changes' during one month!

Thus, it was Halutz's cluelessness that brought about the blubbering the ensues, whenever we don't know what we are doing.

This is what filtered down the channels of command down to the private soldier – not complicated language but confused direction – batallion commanders mastered avoidance from receiving orders, knowing it made no sense but to throw them into killing zones; combat helicopters refused to provide ground support across the international border; an advanced missile ship cruised Lebanese territorial water unprotected; special units were not employed in their specific expertise but on regular missions.

Units were being held next to the border for weeks, losing all their fighting spirit while the cabinet debated what to do next; company commanders received over seventy mission changes in two weeks! [Yakir Segev, my husband, was such company commander. He is here today, you could talk to him about it.]; his coordinating officer called me two weeks after he was drafted: "Don't worry, Yakir entered Lebanon, but they are secured inside a building…".

That was the most troubling news I could have heard, knowing houses were an RPG death trap. It finally dawned on me, the chiefs had no faith in their soldiers ability to beat the enemy.

My talk is coming to a close. I have said harsh words. But I'm an optimistic. And I'll tell you why. Because I was also fortunate to see real genius in the IDF. And I know it was a matter of choice, not of incapability, that caused that turn of events.

So, how do militaries know if they are following a *Leonardo* or a *Hamelin Flute*? For all of British you in the audience, pay attention. This is where your history and zionist history share a fault – "there once was a man of genius, who might have become a man of destiny". Winston Churchill said that on Major General Orde Wingate upon his death.

I am mentioning Wingate not just because I spent five years of my life researching him, but since his long-range penetration concept remains unmatched to this day. It is also a good insight as to what we could have done in Southern Lebanon.

In a nutshell, Wingate raised a hybrid division-sized force, incorporating aerial and terrestrial components, which logic was to penetrate the enemy rear in a complex ecology, simultaneously by land and air and from all directions, while maintaining autarkic presence in enemy depth for months. Long Range Penetration columns traveled light and were 100 percent lethal, operating dispersely to instill confusion and attract enemy attention, then amassing at will to destroy those forces. The idea was to attack the enemy where he was not prepared and gradually turn the enemy system on itself. In a matter of weeks he managed to deliver an operational strike on the Japanese system, and would have carried it through strategic decision if not for that plane crash.

Wingate ideas were so novel, he convinced not only Churchill to greenlight it, but had Admiral Mountbatten, soon to become Chief of Defence Staff, declare the entire army's transformation to long range penetration force. However, when war atmosphere dissolved, traditional British military establishment got rid of it. Nowadays Wingate's legacy is buried in Arlington Cemetery, his exploits are banned from command schools curriculum in Britain.

So what is a good doctrine? It should juggle a system of tensions – between process and product; between institutionalization and change; between generic content and context; between functional environments. A good doctrine needs to enable learning through teaching. But above all, a good doctrine needs good generals. I shall end with Bernard Fergusson's definition of just that:

"Wingate was, indeed, a fearsome man to cross; he had only one standard, and that was perfection. He seemed almost to rejoice in making enemies, and in erecting additional barriers through which to break. By some, chiefly journalists, he had been idealised; by others, chiefly professional rivals, he has been decried. His was a complex character, but two things are sure. First, he was a military genius of grandeur and stature seen not more than once or twice in a century. Secondly, no other officer I have heard of could

have dreamed the dream, planned the plan, obtained, trained, inspired, and led the force. There are men who shine at planning, or at training, or at leading: here was a man who excelled at all three, and whose vision at the council-table matched his genius in the field."